{"id":1843,"date":"2026-04-30T17:06:31","date_gmt":"2026-04-30T14:06:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/?p=1843"},"modified":"2026-04-30T17:06:33","modified_gmt":"2026-04-30T14:06:33","slug":"what-does-sukarnos-1959-visit-tell-us-about-turkiye-today","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/what-does-sukarnos-1959-visit-tell-us-about-turkiye-today\/","title":{"rendered":"What does Sukarno\u2019s 1959 visit tell us about T\u00fcrkiye today?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p style=\"font-size:30px\">by <strong>Nuri Kurnaz<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Within the span of a single week in April 2026, T\u00fcrkiye was described in two entirely different ways by senior European figures. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte praised its defence industry as a model for NATO-Allies. Meanwhile, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen placed T\u00fcrkiye alongside Russia and China in the context of Europe\u2019s geopolitical challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"292\" height=\"408\" src=\"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/ABCDDD_010875853_mpeg21_p001_image-1.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-1847\" style=\"aspect-ratio:0.7156906051658801;width:553px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/ABCDDD_010875853_mpeg21_p001_image-1.jpg 292w, https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/ABCDDD_010875853_mpeg21_p001_image-1-215x300.jpg 215w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 292px) 100vw, 292px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">AANVAL OP NEDERLAND \u2013 Turkse kritiek op rede van Soekarno, Clipping from\u00a0<em>De Volkskrant<\/em>\u00a0(April 29, 1959), consulted via Delpher on April 30, 2026.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p>These two comments took me back to my time at the Netherlands Institute in Turkey (NIT) in 2021, where I spent two months digging into Dutch-Turkish-Indonesian relations. I explored how these connections played out across colonial, postcolonial, and Cold War contexts. In this blogpost, I\u2019m drawing on that research, alongside my current doctoral work on the history of European integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Many historical actors have grappled with T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s geopolitical place. Despite the fact that the modern Turkish Republic has always had different options for alignment, a historical perspective reveals how the country has structurally chosen to align itself with the West. A telling such episode is the 1959 visit of Indonesian president Ahmed Sukarno to T\u00fcrkiye.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Sukarno\u2019s visit to T\u00fcrkiye in 1959<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Sukarno visited T\u00fcrkiye from 24 to 27 April in 1959 as the first stop of a broader diplomatic tour. It followed the Bandung Conference of 1955, which was an important moment in the history of the Non-Aligned Movement. Despite its clearly aligned position within the Western bloc, T\u00fcrkiye had also been present at the Bandung Conference, also known as the <em>Konferensi Asia-Afrika<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>One of the purposes of Sukarno\u2019s world trip, four years after the Bandung Conference, was to improve and build Indonesia\u2019s international relations. Starting in T\u00fcrkiye with this charm offensive was a logical step, because the countries had good international relations. Once in T\u00fcrkiye, the Indonesian President received honorary doctorates and was invited to address the Turkish Assembly. In this delivered speech, Sukarno first praised the historical relations between T\u00fcrkiye and Indonesia. He claimed that the Ottoman Empire had helped the Aceh Sultanate in Northern-Sumatra against European colonialism in the 16<sup>th<\/sup> century.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Sukarno said to have brought his gratitude for this aid only after three hundred years, because colonialism had broken the historical allegiance among the Turkish and Indonesian peoples. For Sukarno it didn\u2019t matter that the exact nature and extent of the Ottoman military assistance in this century remain a matter of historical debate. He had come to re-establish relations and it was a useful reference for this aim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Turkish and Indonesian peoples were presented by Sukarno as two friendly peoples, who shared cultural and religious ties. Moreover, they were two peoples who had gained their independence in 1923 and 1945 after similar struggles. This resulted in holding similar positions in world affairs. The applaud he received after these words shows that Sukarno succeeded in at least one of his world tour\u2019s aims: to improve Indonesia\u2019s international prestige and (re-)establish relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, there was a second aim of Sukarno\u2019s tour. The other aim was to gain backing in Indonesia\u2019s dispute with the Netherlands over New Guinea. Although Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945, it took the Netherlands four years and a bloody colonial war to officially accept this independence in 1949. However, Netherlands New Guinea (also known as West Papua or West Irian) was not part of the Transfer of Sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, and continued to be part of the Dutch Kingdom until 1962. It was amid the diplomatic tensions between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West Papua that Sukarno came to T\u00fcrkiye and delivered his speech in the Turkish Parliament.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Sukarno sharply critiqued colonialism and what he described as neo-colonialist Dutch policy in New Guinea. From the Turkish Parliament in Ankara, he declared that \u201cthe imperialist world is a dangerous world, because it still strives for its own success.\u201d According to Sukarno, the era of great empires had come to an end and the age of imperialism was also drawing to a close. He argued that the imperial world order was built upon a flawed principle: \u201cthat peoples could rule over other peoples.\u201d He continued to declare that \u201cWest Irian, is still being subjected to colonial treatment by those who have recently treated our vast country as a colony.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This criticism of the Netherlands was a bold move during the heightened tensions of the Cold War era. But Sukarno did also try to strike a balance. He acknowledged T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s position within the Western alliance and made clear he did not intend to offend it. Indonesia, after all, pursued a non-aligned path, while T\u00fcrkiye had made different choices based on its security concerns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Still, the reaction in Ankara was tense. The speech caused a political stir, and T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s foreign minister faced serious criticism for allowing a NATO partner to be attacked so openly in the Turkish Parliament. Some Members of Parliament even called for the Minister\u2019s resignation. This reaction was unsurprising, because T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s NATO membership formed (and still forms) the cornerstone of its security policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For T\u00fcrkiye, the decade opened with Turkish troops fighting in the Korean War and closed with the deployment of American nuclear weapons on Turkish soil. Their strategic placement was the prelude to the Cuban Missile Crisis. While the experiences of Korean War veterans remained deeply embedded in the country\u2019s collective memory, and T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s strategic location increased in importance due to the deployment of atomic bombs, Sukarno\u2019s criticism of a NATO-ally was unacceptable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In addition to giving a fascinating perspective into the Cold War era, what this episode shows is that T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s commitment to its Western alliances has been historically continuous, even when it conflicted with its other affinities. With Indonesia it shared cultural and strong religious affinities, but its political and ideological alignment proved much more important.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Western alignment is historically continuous.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>T\u00fcrkiye and the world have of course changed in unrecognisable ways since 1959. However, the hierarchy of Turkish priorities is still the same. Seen in this light, the present is not much different. T\u00fcrkiye continues to move between different geopolitical spaces and cultural blocs, but it always prioritises its Western alliance and continues to see itself as a crucial part of the Western bloc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Some recent diplomatic crises have of course not contributed to mutual understanding between T\u00fcrkiye and the West. The diplomatic crisis with the Netherlands in 2017, when Rutte was still Prime-Minister of the country, can, for example, be mentioned. And indeed, WNL, A Dutch broadcaster, known to be close to Rutte\u2019s party in the Netherlands, reminded the Dutch public this week of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan\u2019s reference to \u201cNazi-remnants and fascists.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These diplomatic crises are usually interpreted as evidence of a structural divergence between T\u00fcrkiye and the West. Yet this obscures a correct analysis of actually structural patterns. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s alignment within the Western security order is historically continuous. Moreover, disagreements are actually constitutive of unity. They proof unity rather than disunity. The disagreements between the West and T\u00fcrkiye are like the disagreements of a married couple, who despite their quarrels continue to stand as partners to the outside world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s purchase of Russian S-400 systems, its bargains over NATO enlargement in Scandinavia, and ongoing tensions with EU-institutions should therefore also not be interpreted as evidence of a drift away from the West. It is exactly because T\u00fcrkiye always prioritises its alignment with the West, that such discussions emerge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This history is not a distant context that historians can provide as fun facts, but it is something that still deeply structures how the country sees itself and its allies. Understanding T\u00fcrkiye today means taking that history seriously. Turkish collective memory is still strongly coloured by the cold-war logic and its identification with the West. Erdogan started his political career during the Cold War and is shaped by it as much as Turkish collective memory is. Perhaps it is an advantage for both T\u00fcrkiye and the NATO that NATO\u2019s Secretary General is a trained historian, who might see these historical continuities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Further Reading<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Primary Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cNa aanval op Nederland Turkse kritiek op Sukarno.\u201d <em>Emmer Courant<\/em>. Emmen, April 29, 1959. Accessed April 23, 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/resolver.kb.nl\/resolve?urn=MMGEM01:163360025:mpeg21:p00014\">https:\/\/resolver.kb.nl\/resolve?urn=MMGEM01:163360025:mpeg21:p00014<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Grand National Assembly of T\u00fcrkiye (TBMM). <em>Speeches<\/em>. 11th Term. Speech by Ahmet Soekarno. Address delivered by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Vol. 8, Session 60, 378\u2013386.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Secondary Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Wim van den Doel. <em>Opheffers: Nederlanders en het ontwikkelen van de wereld, 1945\u20131963<\/em>. Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Dilek Barlas, and Serhat G\u00fcven\u00e7. \u201cTurkey and the Idea of a European Union during the Inter-war Years, 1923\u201339.\u201d <em>Middle Eastern Studies<\/em> 45, no. 3 (2009): 425\u2013446.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anthony Reid. \u201cTurkey as Aceh\u2019s Alternative Imperium.\u201d <em>Archipel<\/em> 87, no. 1 (2014): 81\u2013102. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3406\/arch.2014.4458\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3406\/arch.2014.4458<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>De Telegraaf. \u201cUrsula von der Leyen Zorgt voor Rel: EU-Kopstuk Plaatst Turkije in Rijtje met China en Rusland aan Vooravond Bezoek NAVO-chef Mark Rutte.\u201d April 22, 2026. Accessed April 23, 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.telegraaf.nl\/buitenland\/ursula-von-der-leyen-zorgt-voor-rel-eu-kopstuk-plaatst-turkije-in-rijtje-met-china-en-rusland-aan-vooravond-bezoek-navo-chef-mark-rutte\/147112731.html\">https:\/\/www.telegraaf.nl\/buitenland\/ursula-von-der-leyen-zorgt-voor-rel-eu-kopstuk-plaatst-turkije-in-rijtje-met-china-en-rusland-aan-vooravond-bezoek-navo-chef-mark-rutte\/147112731.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Euractiv. \u201cEU-Turkey Relations Nosedive Ahead of Cyprus Summit.\u201d April 22, 2026. Accessed April 23, 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euractiv.com\/news\/eu-turkey-relations-nosedive-ahead-of-cyprus-summit\/\">https:\/\/www.euractiv.com\/news\/eu-turkey-relations-nosedive-ahead-of-cyprus-summit\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Related Projects:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Netherlands Institute in Turkey. \u201cLooted Ottoman Heritage from Dutch-Indonesia.\u201d Accessed April 23, 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nit-istanbul.org\/projects\/looted-ottoman-heritage-from-dutch-indonesia?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/www.nit-istanbul.org\/projects\/looted-ottoman-heritage-from-dutch-indonesia<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>University of Amsterdam. \u201cColonial Exceptionalism or Co-Imperialism?\u201d Accessed April 23, 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/artes.uva.nl\/content\/research-groups\/colonial-exceptionalism-or-co-imperialism\/colonial-exceptionalism-or-co-imperialism.html\">https:\/\/artes.uva.nl\/content\/research-groups\/colonial-exceptionalism-or-co-imperialism\/colonial-exceptionalism-or-co-imperialism.html<\/a>.<a id=\"_msocom_1\"><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>by Nuri Kurnaz Within the span of a single week in April 2026, T\u00fcrkiye was described in two entirely different ways by senior European figures. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte praised [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":1847,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[275,276,278,281,274,280,271,272,273,279,270,277],"class_list":["post-1843","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog-posts","tag-bandungconference","tag-coldwarhistory","tag-decolonization","tag-diplomatichistory","tag-natopolitics","tag-nonalignedmovement","tag-postcolonialstudies","tag-sukarno1959","tag-turkeyindonesia","tag-turkishforeignpolicy","tag-turkiyehistory","tag-westpapua"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/ABCDDD_010875853_mpeg21_p001_image-1.jpg","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1843","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1843"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1843\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1851,"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1843\/revisions\/1851"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1847"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1843"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1843"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nit-istanbul.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1843"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}